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Bradley Canon, a political scientist, has identified more than ten
meanings of the terms "judicial activism" and "judicial restraint."'
Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that I have little orig-
inal to add to the discussion. Indeed, my lack of originality is so
great that this Comment is primarily an elaboration of some points
touched on in passing in Professor Cox's more wide-ranging article.
Nonetheless, it may help to restate them in my own way.
My basic theme is that the concepts of activism and restraint
are, in themselves, quite unhelpful because they refer to too many
things. I will identify five different meanings of activism and show
that they are independent of each other. Thus, when someone de-
scribes a decision or a judge as activist, we have to know which
meaning is intended. Yet, once we identify the precise meaning at
issue, we can discuss the merits of the underlying claim without us-
ing the terms activism or restraint. As we will see, however, there is
a sixth meaning of the concepts which is not entirely independent of
the prior ones. Even that final meaning, though, does not make the
concepts very interesting.
The first meaning of judicial activism is technical. The
Supreme Court is supposed to decide only real cases; it is not sup-
posed to give advice to people who simply would like to know
whether some law is constitutional or not. According to this defini-
tion of activism, the Court should therefore decide cases only when
its decision will actually affect people's legal rights. Consider, then,
some examples. The Price-Anderson Act2 is a federal law about in-
surance for disasters at nuclear power plants. Under the Price-An-
derson Act, if a disaster occurs at a nuclear power plant, the entire
industry helps pay for the damages, but only up to a specified and,
according to most analysts, still rather low limit, despite recent
amendments. Opponents of nuclear power brought a suit claiming
that the Price-Anderson Act was unconstitutional because if a nu-
clear disaster occurred and damages exceeded the statutory limit,
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Harvard College,
1967; M.A., Yale University, 1971;J.D., Yale Law School, 1971.
1. See Canon, A Framework for the Analysis offJudicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT Ac-
TIVISM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb ed. 1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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people who lived near the plant would bear uncompensated losses
while the rest of us got the benefit of nuclear power.3 This might
seem to be a request for an advisory opinion because the Price-An-
derson limit has never been exceeded in any nuclear disaster. The
Court reached the merits of the constitutional challenge anyway.4 It
found that there was a real and present controversy between people
who lived near the site of a proposed nuclear plant and the power
company. The residents would be injured not by a nuclear disaster,
which might never occur, but by the fact that the plant would dis-
charge heated water into a nearby lake, thus making the lake less
suitable for recreation. And Price-Anderson would cause this injury
because the power company would not build the plant unless it were
sure that its liability for future disasters would be limited. It seems
fair to describe the Court's decision to reach the merits of the con-
stitutional challenge as activist according to the first meaning of
activism.
Another example of activism in this sense comes from the area
of criminal law. Many state constitutions have provisions quite simi-
lar to those in the federal constitution. Sometimes a defendant
claims that evidence found in a search should be excluded from trial
because the search was unconstitutional. If the search is found un-
constitutional under state law, the Supreme Court cannot do any-
thing about the decision to exclude the evidence because it has the
power to review only decisions based on federal law. What if the
state court says that it is excluding the evidence because the search
violated both the state and the federal constitutions? A Supreme
Court decision saying that the state court was wrong about the fed-
eral constitution would be an advisory opinion, because the state
court would still exclude the evidence based on its interpretation of
state law. Sometimes, though, state courts do not make it clear that
they are relying on their state constitutions, especially when the lan-
guage of the two constitutions is similar. A court interested in judi-
cial restraint would resolve these ambiguities by refusing to hear the
cases, thus avoiding the risk of rendering an advisory opinion. In
1983 the Supreme Court moved in the other, activist direction,
adopting the rule that it would assume that ambiguous decisions re-
lied on the federal constitution.5
Here we should note two things. The Price-Anderson opinion
was written by Chief Justice Burger, and the state constitution deci-
3. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
4. Id. at 82.
5. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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sion was written by Justice O'Connor. This first type of activism,
then, is not the same as "liberalism," as we usually think of it. Sec-
ond, I have not yet described the Court's decisions on the merits in
these cases, and when I do you will see why there are other mean-
ings of activism. The Court upheld the Price-Anderson Act;6 it also
held that the criminal evidence at issue should not have been ex-
cluded.7 In both cases the Court did not overturn the decisions of
democratically elected or responsible decisionmakers.
The second meaning of activism is also somewhat technical,
although it begins to move in a more substantive direction. Profes-
sor Cox alludes to it in his discussion of the propriety of and limits
upon overruling prior Supreme Court decisions. According to the
second meaning of activism, a court is activist if it readily overturns
precedents, at least without severe problems having arisen in the
administration of the rule derived from the precedent. At the end of
its most recent term, the Court demonstrated its activism in this
sense by overruling three cases, two decided in the 1960s and one
handed down in 1860.8 Yet the present Court cannot be regarded as
completely activist in this sense; on at least two recent occasions, the
Court adhered to precedents that at least some of its members re-
garded as not very well reasoned.' Once again, we should consider
the proposition that activism in this second sense is not the same
thing as "conservatism," as Professor Cox has stressed. Were the
Court to overrule Roe v. Wade,' 0 for example, it would be activist in
this sense and conservative in political terms.
The third meaning of judicial activism is linked to the idea of
democracy. An activist decision substitutes the judgment of
unelected judges for those of elected decisionmakers. Again, con-
sider some examples. A city school board, an elected body, negoti-
ated a contract with a teachers' union, itself an internally democratic
body. Among other provisions, the contract dealt with layoffs in the
face of fiscal stringency or declining enrollments. The layoff provi-
6. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 85.
7. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051.
8. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (overruling Parden
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)); Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987)
(overruling O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S.
Ct. 2802 (1987) (overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860)).
9. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1985) (reversing conviction of defendant
indicted by grand jury selected in racially discriminating manner); Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104 (1985) (holding that federal court in habeas corpus proceeding may indepen-
dently determine voluntariness of confession).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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sion had an affirmative action element, according to which the usual
principle of seniority-"first hired, last fired"-was tempered by an
effort to maintain the positions of more recently hired minority
teachers. It should be noted, too, that whites were a majority in the
city and in the teachers' union. Disgruntled white teachers, who had
been unable to persuade or muster enough political clout to influ-
ence either the school board or their union, turned to the federal
courts." The Supreme Court's decision invalidating the contract
freely negotiated between two democratically responsible bodies is
activist in this third sense.
Another example of judicial activism is provided by a more re-
cent case. California's voters have created a Coastal Commission
whose goal is to protect the coastline. One way it does so is by re-
quiring that people with homes on the coast obtain permits for any
home alterations. The Commission can impose conditions on the
permits-for example, it can specify that a home addition be built
according to certain methods that minimize the risk of beach ero-
sion. In a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, homeown-
ers wanted to replace their beach bungalow with a larger house.' 2
The Commission required the homeowners, as a condition of ob-
taining the required building permit, to provide public access to the
beach in front of their house. The homeowners claimed that the
Commission was "taking" their property-the right to exclusive use
of the beach-without compensating them as required by the Con-
stitution. The Court's decision in favor of the homeowners' 3 was
activist in the third sense, overturning a decision by a democratically
responsible body.
Once again we see that there is no necessary connection be-
tween conservatism and restraint in this third sense. Perhaps more
important, though, is that calling a decision activist because it over-
turns a decision made by a democratic body is simply saying that the
decision is an application of the Constitution, at least so long as we
think that judicial review is part of the Constitution. After all, we
would not have judicial review if we thought that majority deci-
sionmakers would always comply with the Constitution.' 4 We can
I1. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
12. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
13. Id. at 3150.
14. This observation undermines the force of Professor Morgan's effort to character-
ize judicial review as the enforcement of a bargain we made with ourselves. After all,
"we"-that is, those of us living today-did not enter into the bargain in any explicit
way; the bargain was made in 1787 and 1868 among people not all of whom are in a
useful sense predecessors in interest to many of us today. Therefore, binding us today
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move to the fourth meaning of activism to see how activism is con-
nected to the idea of constitutionalism. Proponents of judicial re-
straint might defend the affirmative action and beachhome decisions
by saying that the Court can overturn decisions made by democrati-
cally responsible bodies, but only when the democratic body has
contravened the clear intent of the drafters of the Constitution. The
fourth meaning ofjudicial activism, then, is that an activist decision
invalidates a statute on some ground other than that it violates the
intent of the framers.
On this occasion I do not want to enter into the debate about
the jurisprudence of "original intention." Rather, I again want to
illustrate the fourth meaning of judicial activism, here by using ex-
amples of judges or decisions that are restrained according to this
meaning. A generation ago Justice Hugo Black was the leading pro-
ponent of judicial restraint in this sense. Black contended that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment intended that the states
would thereafter have to comply with the requirements of the Bill of
Rights, and cited speeches in the House and Senate by the amend-
ment's primary sponsors saying exactly that.' 5 He argued that the
establishment clause of the first amendment rather severely limited
the permissible official interactions between church and state, rely-
ing on arguments developed by James Madison, the primary author
of the establishment clause, in the course of his ten-year effort to
have Virginia adopt its Statute on Religious Liberty. 16 More recent
conservative critics of Black have shown that it is necessary to qual-
ify Black's historical arguments around the edges, but his funda-
mental points remain unimpaired.
Justice Black was a straightforward liberal originalist. More sub-
tle is the originalism of Louis Brandeis, who relied on his interpreta-
tion of the framers' basic theory of the relation between government
and citizen to state his-and to Brandeis, the framers'-understand-
ing of free speech in an eloquent opinion in 1927.' 7 Note the open-
ing words of each sentence in the opinion's core passage: "Those
who won our independence believed .... They valued liberty .... They
believed liberty .... They believed that freedom .... They recog-
nized the risks .... But they knew .... [and finally] Believing in the
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed
to the bargain that they struck then requires some justification independent of the ra-
tionale that bargains should be enforced.
15. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
16. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
17. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form."'"
By examining the framers' general theories of government, Justice
Brandeis, like later originalists, could use a theory of judicial re-
straint in the fourth sense to limit decisions made by democratic
processes, thus promoting judicial activism in the third sense.
It is a matter of some controversy among scholars of constitu-
tional law how far one can go with this sort of originalism. Some
have defended the Court's death penalty decisions by invoking their
reconstruction of the framers' theory of government.' 9 Others are
troubled by such arguments but have difficulty explaining why
something like wiretapping, which the framers could not have con-
templated, ought to be regulated by the Constitution. Every argu-
ment that brings wiretapping in opens the way to the much broader
arguments I have mentioned. The fourth meaning of judicial activ-
ism (and restraint), which limits the concepts to the jurisprudence of
original intention, is therefore less useful than the preceding three
meanings, because it does not really point to any identifiable phe-
nomenon in the behavior of courts.20
The fifth meaning of activism derives from the citizen's per-
spective on the government. 2' From the citizen's point of view what
matters most is how his or her life is constrained by government.2 2
The organ or branch of government imposing such constraints is
much less important to the citizen than the scope of the constraints.
According to the fifth meaning of activism, we should look at the
activity of the government as a whole: an activist court is an arm of
an activist government. For example, the Court in the 1940s was an
activist court with respect to economic matters, because it endorsed
the actions of the New Deal in imposing governmental constraints
on private economic activity. A more recent example ofjudicial ac-
tivism in this sense of supporting an activist government is the
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick21 upholding state
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., Richards, Book Review, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1372 (1983).
20. It might be useful in those occasional cases when judges fail even to invoke
originalist arguments. The standards of the practice of writing opinions, however, al-
most invariably lead judges to include such invocations. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coher-
ence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (1987).
2 1. This meaning is also related to some arguments by political scientists about the
place of courts in a government. See M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLIT-
ICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
22. See Seidman, ABSCAM and the Constitution, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1204-07
(1985).
23. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). One might somewhat more controversially characterize
the Court's general position on criminal procedure as activist in this sense. Certainly,
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laws against private consensual sodomy. Conversely, an example of
judicial restraint in this fifth sense, that is, of judicial limitations
placed on governmental regulation of private life, would of course
be the abortion cases in the Supreme Court.2 4
Once again this collection of examples shows that activism is
not necessarily related to conventional "conservative" or "liberal"
labels. In this fifth sense the sodomy decision was activist and con-
servative, the New Deal cases were activist and liberal, and the abor-
tion decisions were restrained and liberal. Similarly, I have argued
that none of the meanings of activism or restraint has any systematic
relation to conventional political labels or indeed to anything else.
What then is the function of these concepts?
Here I turn to the sixth and final meaning of activism and re-
straint. They are what philosophers have called "praise words" and
"blame words." Given an extended discussion of the courts in
which the sentence "This was an activist decision" appears, we can
translate the sentence, knowing its context, as "I approve (or disap-
prove) of the decision." Similarly, if the sentence is "I disapprove
of this decision because it exemplifies judicial activism," we know
nothing more after hearing the second half of the sentence than we
did after hearing the first half.
We offer praise and blame according to some underlying theo-
ries, of course, and we might choose to capture those theories with a
single word or phrase like activism or restraint. Yet when that same
word or phrase is used to summarize different underlying theories-
for example, majoritarianism (the third meaning I discussed) and
originalism (the fourth meaning)-the likely result is confusion. For
almost a generation legal scholars of constitutional law have argued
that it was unhelpful to talk about the courts using the terms activ-
ism and restraint. The ambiguity of the implied reference to under-
lying theories explains why.
This might suggest the conclusion that the terms ought to be
abandoned. There is, however, one final observation that seems
worth making. I have called activism and restraint praise and blame
words. If we look at the actual rhetoric of discussions of the
Supreme Court, we see that they are not equally so. Sometimes peo-
ple mean to praise a decision by calling it activist, but usually activ-
the Court's overall enthusiasm for intrusive methods of crime detection and investiga-
tion seems activist, yet it seems hard to defend a posture of governmental restraint per
se in the detection and investigation of crime.
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
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ism is a blame word, and conversely with restraint. I suspect that
activism tends to be a blame word for relatively deep cultural rea-
sons, primarily because of the fourth-"activist state"-meaning of
activism. Everyone knows that, looked at over the long run, our
government has become increasingly activist, and almost everyone
is a little uneasy about that development. Activism as a blame word
captures that unease. (Consider how it would sound if we started
talking about "judicial energy" and "judicial lassitude.") Yet we
also know that there is very little we can do to halt the rise of activist
government, so we cannot let activism become a blame word alto-
gether. The ambiguities of the idea of judicial activism let people
express their unease about activist government. In the first in-
stance, it directs the criticism at the courts, an institution that is
quite unimportant in the overall development of the activist state.25
And in the last instance, it allows people to say that they are uneasy
about activist government without doing much about it. In the end,
I suspect, the concept of judicial activism is the last, relatively trivial
bastion of conservative opposition to the modern state.
25. For example, the courts have had essentially nothing to say about national secur-
ity policy, the size of the budget--even (for the most part) its allocation between domes-
tic and military expenditures-tax policy, and the like.
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